<center style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;"><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span></center><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> <em>抛出“中共崩溃论”<wbr>的美国学者沈大伟接受采访时表示不会改变自己的判断，<wbr>他同时强调说，习近平目前所做的一切只会加速中共体制的崩溃。</em></span><em><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /></em><br /><table cellpadding="4" align="left" border="0" width="300" height="250" style="color: #000000; font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;"><tbody></tbody></table><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> 美国著名中国问题专家沈大伟（David Shambaugh）<wbr>日前发表的一篇文章称中共崩溃过程已经开始，<wbr>引发中国国内外一片哗然，支持者与反对者都发表了大量讨论文章，<wbr>沈大伟本人当地时间3月15日接受纽约时报采访，<wbr>解释了他对中国前景持悲观态度的原因，<wbr>并称短期内这一判断不会改变。</span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> 沈大伟表示，在此前他的一本专著当中，<wbr>他曾详细讨论过中国共产党统治的萎缩与适应问题。<wbr>他一直在阐述和解释的一个重要观点是，<wbr>对所有发展到后期的一党制列宁主义国家、<wbr>以及其他威权主义国家来说，<wbr>发生萎缩都是一种自然并且常见的现象，<wbr>问题在于列宁主义政党会如何应对这种萎缩，以避免最终的失败。<wbr>通常来说，政党可以选择被动地做出防御性的反应，具体而言，<wbr>就是靠镇压手段维持统治，但还有另一种途径，是积极地、<wbr>能动地通过开放和尝试引导变化的发生来维持统治。沈大伟认为，<wbr>2000年前后直到2008年，在曾庆红的主持下，<wbr>中共选择的是第二种途径，但从2009年曾庆红下台以后，<wbr>中共的统治趋向发生了剧烈转变。</span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> 2009年9月的中共第十七届四中全会上就“党的建设”<wbr>问题通过了一项极具进步意义的决议，<wbr>它基本上把此前八年曾庆红以及整个中国共产党所推进的举措制度化<wbr>了。但事实并非如此，由于之前新疆和西藏的暴动，<wbr>实际上当时的中共已经变得非常紧张，沈大伟认为，<wbr>十七届四中全会的决议文件仅仅是对此前改革进程的一种总结，<wbr>由于难以将中共改变路线这一问题公之于众，<wbr>而该文件筹备了近一年之久，因此它仍然被如常公布了。但事实上，<wbr>现实当中中共转向了严厉镇压，并且放弃了此前的积极政治改革。</span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> 沈大伟对于中共改变路线的原因提出了自己的猜测，<wbr>他认为，尽管同时也存在其他的影响因素，<wbr>但最为重要的原因是中国强大的官僚系统对加强控制具有浓厚兴趣，<wbr>能够在去除了曾庆红的影响之后成功劝说胡锦涛相信，<wbr>如果中共不采取严厉措施，收回一系列领域的控制权，<wbr>局势就会失控。</span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> 因此，沈大伟认为，中国以及中共本身发生了深刻变化，<wbr>这导致研究者对于中国的看法也随之改变。<wbr>尽管镇压可能是共产党的“默认选项”，但并非唯一选项。然而，<wbr>没有人知道共产党能否在改革过程当中控制住局势，<wbr>或者体制会不会像苏联一样随着改革而崩溃，<wbr>这导致中共实际上面临着进退两难的局面，除此之外，<wbr>经济和社会层面的积弊同样会动摇共产党的统治基础。</span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> 在谈及习近平时，沈大伟表示，<wbr>他对于习近平上任以后的执政方向并不意外，<wbr>使他意外的是习近平巩固自身权力的速度。一般而言，<wbr>中国新领导人巩固自身地位需要两到三年的时间，<wbr>但习近平打破了这一规律。沈大伟同时强调，<wbr>不应将习近平个人权力的巩固和中共总体实力或者习近平掌握权力的<wbr>能力相混淆，在沈大伟看来，后二者都是非常脆弱的。</span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> 对于习近平与戈尔巴乔夫之间的类比，沈大伟称，<wbr>他始终坚持认为习近平对于戈尔巴乔夫的所作所为有极深的仇视，<wbr>因为认为改革将会导致党和国家的崩溃，<wbr>他对类似的改革没有分毫兴趣。问题在于，<wbr>习近平抵制政治改革和支持严厉镇压的做法将会对中共体制产生与戈<wbr>尔巴乔夫改革非常类似的影响：<wbr>镇压将给本已损坏的系统以强大压力，而这将加速它的崩溃。</span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> <wbr>对于习近平镇压异见者和独立公民组织以及持不同意见的新闻媒体的<wbr>看法，沈大伟表示，对于依靠镇压维持统治的社会，<wbr>一旦执法者放松了其工作，政治系统就会很快全面崩解。此时此刻，<wbr>中国的执法者群体仍然强大，仍然在高效地完成其工作，<wbr>沈大伟认为这对于中国并无好处，但这就是现实。</span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> </span><br style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #ffffff;" /><div><span style="font-family: 宋体; font-size: 16px; line-height: 24px; background-color: #f6f6f6;"> 尽管“中国崩溃论”发表后遇到了许多质疑，<wbr>但沈大伟仍然对中国前景持悲观态度。他认为对中国来说，渐进的、<wbr>由中共主导的政治开放和改革是比镇压更好的选择，<wbr>但尽管他对此怀有希望，但由于习近平、<wbr>刘云山和其他中共高层对政治改革的看法，实行改革的可能性很低。<wbr>沈大伟指出，从毛泽东时代起中国政治就陷在一个开放-<wbr>封闭的循环当中，通常开放阶段持续五到六年，<wbr>而封闭阶段两到三年。现在，封闭已经持续了七年，<wbr>但仍然难以看到乐观的希望。</span></div><div> </div><div style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8000001907349px; background-color: #ffffff;"></div><div style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8000001907349px; background-color: #ffffff;">附录英文原文－－</div><div style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8000001907349px; background-color: #ffffff;"></div><div style="color: #222222; 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font-size: 0.6875rem; line-height: 0.875rem;"><address style="font-style: normal; font-size: 0.6875rem; line-height: 0.75rem; font-weight: 700; font-family: nyt-cheltenham-sh, georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; display: inline-block; color: #000000; margin: 0px;">By <a href="http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/author/chris-buckley/" title="More Posts by Chris Buckley" rel="author" target="_blank" style="color: #000000; text-decoration: none; text-transform: uppercase;">CHRIS BUCKLEY</a></address> MARCH 15, 2015 9:00 PM<span style="width: 1px; min-height: 1px; padding: 0px; border-width: 0px 0px 0px 1px; border-left-style: solid; border-left-color: #cccccc; overflow: hidden;">March 15, 2015 9:00 pm</span></div><div style="width: 480px; margin-left: 120px;"><div style="width: 592px; margin-top: 5px; margin-bottom: 15px; padding-top: 0px;"><span style="width: 1px; min-height: 1px; padding: 0px; border: 0px; overflow: hidden;">Photo</span><div style="margin-bottom: 7px;"><img src="https://ci3.googleusercontent.com/proxy/Yz5Bu4IGukXdxkf1a594qVABVBMX3iffz6xPJ5iyQsiunMUKq4h5YON8JUEIBblyGA0_ESyCv4ZGmKWEm55XlLBrOhVQ-ZeoKZg0lkHy-K61fuEjpoiTVSTLZvJoiPaUTi6CdEMWtN8XbwRw1mtZQTj0okuox8gLFVyxXA=s0-d-e1-ft#http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2015/03/13/world/13sino-shambaugh/13sino-shambaugh-tmagArticle.jpg" width="592" height="390" alt="Chinese paramilitary officers marching on Tiananmen Square before the opening session of the National People’s Congress on March 5." tabindex="0" style="cursor: pointer; outline: 0px; max-width: 100%; display: block; width: 592px;" /><div dir="ltr" style="position: absolute; font-family: arial, sans-serif; opacity: 0.01; left: 664.000015258789px; top: 2434.80002593994px;"><div id=":ry" role="button" tabindex="0" aria-label="Download attachment " data-tooltip-class="a1V" data-tooltip="Download" style="position: relative; display: inline-block; border-radius: 3px; cursor: pointer; font-size: 11px; font-weight: bold; white-space: nowrap; margin-right: 0px; height: 24px; line-height: 23px; min-width: 0px; outline: 0px; padding: 0px; -webkit-box-shadow: none; box-shadow: none; color: #444444; margin-left: 8px; width: 30px; background: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.6);"><div style="position: relative; display: inline-block; cursor: pointer; vertical-align: middle; height: 21px; width: 21px; background: url(https://ssl.gstatic.com/mail/sprites/newattachmentcards-d55fda9fb0fa088d70b60006ae47efb3.png) -219px -129px no-repeat;"></div></div></div></div>Chinese paramilitary officers marching on Tiananmen Square before the opening session of the National People’s Congress on March 5.<span style="font-size: 0.75rem; line-height: 1rem; color: #999999;"><span style="width: 1px; min-height: 1px; padding: 0px; border: 0px; overflow: hidden;">Credit</span> How Hwee Young/European Pressphoto Agency</span></div><div style="width: 91px; float: left; clear: left;"><ul style="margin: 0px 0px 11px; list-style: none; padding-left: 0px; font-size: 1rem;"><li style="margin-left: 15px; font-size: 0.625rem; line-height: 1.5625rem; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; padding: 0px; border-top-width: 0px; list-style: none; background-image: none;"><a style="color: #808080; display: block; padding-left: 5px; margin: 2px 0px; min-height: 23px; text-transform: capitalize; font-size: 0.8125rem; line-height: 1.5625rem; padding-bottom: 10px; padding-top: 10px;">Email</a></li><li style="margin-left: 15px; font-size: 0.625rem; line-height: 1.5625rem; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; padding: 0px; border-top-width: 1px; border-top-style: solid; border-top-color: #e2e2e2; list-style: none; 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display: block; padding-left: 5px; margin: 2px 0px; min-height: 23px; text-transform: capitalize; font-size: 0.8125rem; line-height: 1.5625rem; padding-bottom: 10px; padding-top: 10px;">Save</a></li><li style="margin-left: 15px; font-size: 0.625rem; line-height: 1.5625rem; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; padding: 0px; border-top-width: 1px; border-top-style: solid; border-top-color: #e2e2e2; list-style: none; background-image: none;"><a style="color: #808080; display: block; padding-left: 5px; margin: 2px 0px; min-height: 23px; text-transform: capitalize; font-size: 0.8125rem; line-height: 1.5625rem; padding-bottom: 10px; padding-top: 10px;">More</a></li></ul><div></div></div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;"><a title="Prof. Shambaugh\’s university web page." href="http://elliott.gwu.edu/shambaugh" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">David Shambaugh</a>, a professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, is one of the United States’ most prominent experts on contemporary China. He has also been prominent in China. His books have been translated and published there, and his views <a title="Xinhua article (in Chinese)." href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-09/21/content_12089297.htm" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">cited</a> in the state media. He was <a title="People\’s Daily article (in Chinese)." href="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2010-05/21/content_523026.htm" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">profiled</a> by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, and in January researchers at the China Foreign Affairs University, which comes under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <a title="PDF in Chinese." href="http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/506035.pdf" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">named</a> him the second-most influential China expert in the United States, behind David M. Lampton at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.</p><div style="width: 190px; margin: 5px 0px 15px 12px; float: right; clear: right; overflow: hidden;"><span style="width: 1px; min-height: 1px; padding: 0px; border: 0px; overflow: hidden;">Photo</span><div style="margin-bottom: 7px;"><img src="https://ci6.googleusercontent.com/proxy/ydtrnenP48G5-1QOVqxqq-2vR7tAsmRhR_DZZrzqBveBkB9xjp2sYxIS_B9USqNa2DxNuQo6Am8tk2c28j6lNZEj7RCT4x88EEX-BpF592S8ejwVLrZjTT-sd4_LuULT0aqaYrgmJDXRn2tem8NYkhcsHLdlAcIGG9dYNGGpFxrXpw=s0-d-e1-ft#http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2015/03/13/world/13sino-shambaugh02/13sino-shambaugh02-articleInline.jpg" width="190" height="240" alt="David Shambaugh" style="max-width: 100%; display: block; width: 190px;" /></div>David Shambaugh<span style="font-size: 0.75rem; line-height: 1rem; color: #999999;"><span style="width: 1px; min-height: 1px; padding: 0px; border: 0px; overflow: hidden;">Credit</span> Courtesy of David Shambaugh</span></div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">Hence the <a title="ChinaFile article (in English)." href="http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/china-really-cracking" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">intense debate</a> ignited by Prof. Shambaugh’s recent <a title="Wall Street Journal essay (in English)." href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">essay</a> in The Wall Street Journal, where he argued that the “endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun” and the Communist Party’s possible “demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent.” Some experts have endorsed his view that China’s outward order and prosperity mask profound risks for the ruling party. Others have argued that the party is more robust, politically and economically, than Prof. Shambaugh asserts. In an interview, he answered some questions raised by his essay:</p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; width: 24px; min-height: 31px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">Q.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;"><span style="font-weight: 700;">Several years ago you published a book titled “China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation,” which highlighted the party’s potential to overcome or contain its problems, such as corruption and eroded authority, through learning and adaptation. Your latest assessment of the party’s long-term prospects of surviving in power seems much bleaker. What prompted you to shift your views?</span> </p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; text-indent: 2px; width: 24px; min-height: 32px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">A.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">My book on the Communist Party was completed in 2007 and published in 2008. The publication date is important because, as you note, I emphasized in that analysis that the party was taking a number of “adaptive” steps to legitimize, reinstitutionalize and save itself. The book analyzed in detail the reasons for the adaptation — largely the results of the party’s study of the causes of collapse of the Soviet Union and other Leninist states, but also because the party had persons in the top leadership during the period I studied, notably the president and party leader, <a title="More articles about Jiang Zemin." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/j/_jiang_zemin/index.html" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">Jiang Zemin</a>, and his ally Zeng Qinghong, the vice president, who derived the main lesson from the Soviet post-mortem that the party had to be proactive and dynamic in its leadership.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">So, the book was mainly about the “adaptation” the party was undertaking. But remember the other word in the subtitle: “atrophy.” The reason that is important is that I argued then, and argue now, that atrophy of late-stage, single-party Leninist, and other authoritarian, states is a normal, natural and ever-present condition. The question is: What do Leninist parties do to cope with the atrophy and stave off inevitable decline? Essentially, they can be reactive and defensive — ruling by repression, in effect — or they can be proactive and dynamic, ruling through opening and trying to guide and manage change. From roughly 2000 through 2008, under Zeng Qinghong’s aegis, the party chose the latter. But in the middle of 2009, after Zeng had retired, it abruptly shifted, in my view.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">One can date it very precisely — Sept. 17, 2009 — the day after the Fourth Plenum of the party’s 17th Central Committee closed. That plenum meeting, which was on “party building,” put out a very progressive “decision” basically codifying everything Zeng and the party had been undertaking the previous eight years. I was living in Beijing that year, and when I read it I thought, “Great!”</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">But it was not to be. The party had, in fact, already grown very nervous during the previous spring and summer with riots in Tibet and Xinjiang. So, my guess is that the Plenum document was a kind of summary of previous years’ reforms, but had to be released because it had been in preparation for nearly a year and it was difficult to publicly announce that the party was going to reverse course, turn towards harsh repression and abandon the proactive political reforms. But that is what happened.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">I have my theories about why they reversed course, essentially having to do with the coming together of strong bureaucracies that have a vested interest in control — propaganda, internal security, the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police, state-owned enterprises — what I call the “Iron Quadrangle” — being able to persuade the party general secretary, <a title="More articles about Hu Jintao." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/hu_jintao/index.html" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">Hu Jintao</a>, who no longer had to deal with Zeng Qinghong, that the party was losing control if it did not crack down and get better control over a variety of spheres. There were other factors as well, but in Chinese politics bureaucratic explanations are usually important. There is also big money in repression. Those bureaucracies’ budgets all ballooned as a result.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">So, there has been a shift in my views of China and of the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy and tactics of rule — simply because China and the party changed! No China watcher can remain wed to arguments that have lost their empirical basis. I have, in fact, been speaking publicly, teaching and publishing along these lines for the past five years. I am the first one who would applaud a return to Zeng Qinghong-like political reform. The party has choices. Repression may be its “default mode,” but it is not its only option. Opening and proactively managing political change is an alternative.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">True, if they tried that — again — there is no guarantee that they could keep control of the process and, as in the Soviet Union, the reforms could cascade out of control, and they would fall from power anyway. So, they have a kind of Hobson’s choice or Catch-22. They can repress and bring about their own demise or they can open up and still possibly bring about their own demise.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">But it is not quite so simple. That is, even if they lightened up on the repression, the other elements affecting the party, economy and society are already hemorrhaging to the point that they may not be able to reverse or halt the slide. This is where the exodus of the elite and the systemic traps in the economy come in. I would add other factors that are contributing to public discontent with the regime: high levels of social inequality, inadequate provision of public goods, pervasive pollution and stagnating wages along with a slowing economy. For these reasons, this is why I see the “endgame” of the Communist Party as being underway. That said, my views about the protracted process of atrophy and decline of the party are more nuanced than the catchy headline used by The Wall Street Journal.</p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; width: 24px; min-height: 31px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">Q.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;"><span style="font-weight: 700;">What has most surprised you about Xi Jinping since he became Communist Party leader in 2012? At the time, you judged that he was likely to be shackled by the influence of rival leaders and party elders. That doesn’t seem to be the case, so far at least.<br /></span></p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; text-indent: 2px; width: 24px; min-height: 32px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">A.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">In most ways I am actually not surprised by Xi Jinping. I was one of the few observers to <a title="Washington Post commentary." href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dont-expect-reform-from-chinas-new-leaders/2012/11/15/82cd4402-2f47-11e2-9f50-0308e1e75445_story.html" target="_blank" style="color: #326891;">write</a> at the time of the 18th Party Congress that we should not expect reform from Xi and were likely to get much more of what we had been witnessing since 2009.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">I think that judgment has been proven largely correct. The one area where Xi has surprised me, though, is the rapidity with which he has consolidated his own personal power as China’s leader. I expected, like most China watchers at the time, a two-to-three-year protracted process of power consolidation, which clearly has not occurred. But, as I argued in the Wall Street Journal piece, we should not mistake Xi’s personal consolidation of power either with the overall strength of the party or even his own grip on power. I see both as very fragile.</p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; width: 24px; min-height: 31px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">Q.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;"><span style="font-weight: 700;">You say that he’s determined not to follow Gorbachev’s fate, and yet he may end up having the same effect as Gorbachev. Could you explain how? We think of Gorbachev as a liberalizing leader who, for better or worse, opened the way to political relaxation in a way that Mr. Xi appears set against. So where do the two leaders’ fates possibly converge?<br /></span></p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; text-indent: 2px; width: 24px; min-height: 32px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">A.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">My argument on this point in the article is very simple: Xi has deep animosity about what Gorbachev did in the Soviet Union with his reforms and has zero interest in pursuing similar reforms, because he thinks that they would lead to the collapse of the party and state. My argument is that he will likely have the same effect by resisting political reforms and by embracing harsh repression. I believe that repression is seriously stressing an already broken system and could well accelerate its collapse. That is why I compared Xi to Gorbachev. Different tactics, same likely result.</p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; width: 24px; min-height: 31px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">Q.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;"><span style="font-weight: 700;">In your assessment of the party’s faltering political hold on the population and its own apparatchiks, you describe your experience at a mind-numbingly dull conference where party scholars appeared as bored as you were. But surely they were no less robotic under Hu Jintao? Don’t the broader messages spread by the party, especially under Xi, have some holding power over many people — such as the party’s claim to be the means of national unity and rejuvenation that will bring China prosperity and strength?</span></p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; text-indent: 2px; width: 24px; min-height: 32px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">A.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">What I argued at the end of the article is that: “Looking ahead, China-watchers should keep their eyes on the regime’s instruments of control and on those assigned to use those instruments. … We should watch for the day when the regime’s propaganda agents and its internal security apparatus start becoming lax in enforcing the party’s writ — or when they begin to identify with dissidents. …”</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">That is future tense — the potential for the regime’s enforcing agents to become lax in their enforcement. I was not arguing that it has already occurred for the propaganda authorities, media, Internet and social media monitors and the Public and State Security apparatchiks. Thus far, these enforcers are showing no such signs of lax enforcement or civil disobedience.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">What you seem to refer to are my observations of “intellectuals” in the system and whether their “robotic” behavior — your term but I agree with it — is more pronounced than under Hu Jintao. Yes, I think it is and that there has been a qualitative shift in the more routinized direction since Xi came to power and launched his Mass Line campaign in the summer of 2013.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">I participate in several such conferences per year — five in 2014, including three sponsored by Central Committee party organs — and have been doing so for a number of years, so I am in a pretty good position to monitor change over time in the behavior of party “intellectuals” and cadres. I lived there from 2009 to 2010 as well. With the exception of the “national rejuvenation” narrative, I do not find that Xi’s slogans and “broader messages,” as you put it, are resonating with the population. Everyone I talk with in China is not at all “inspired” by the unrelenting tsunami of slogans pouring out of the propaganda system, many attributed to Xi himself.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">The national rejuvenation narrative seems to have had greater traction. But I would remind you that virtually every leader of China since the Qing dynasty — Li Hongzhang, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao, Deng and every leader up to Xi – has asserted this meme. So, Xi is hardly unique. To be strong again, and thereby respected in the world, has long been the primary craving of Chinese.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">People also seem very put off by the mounting personality cult around Xi and his breaking of the collective and consensual decision-making norm that the Chinese leadership has worked so hard to build and maintain since the days of Mao.</p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; width: 24px; min-height: 31px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">Q.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;"><span style="font-weight: 700;">Under Mr. Xi, the party has waged an intense offensive against dissent, independent civic groups and maverick news media, which you note. Why do you expect that will ultimately come back to haunt the party? For the time being, the government appears to have extinguished many sources of potential criticism or opposition with little backlash. Do you expect that to change?</span></p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; text-indent: 2px; width: 24px; min-height: 32px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">A.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">Please see my previous reply about repression stressing the system and the need to carefully watch the enforcer-agents of repression of these sectors. If — and that is if — they begin to get lax in their enforcement, then the party system could all unravel rather quickly. But, for the time being, like you, I see what I describe as the “coercive apparatus” as being quite strong and doing their jobs effectively. It is unfortunate for China, but it is the reality.</p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; width: 24px; min-height: 31px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">Q.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;"><span style="font-weight: 700;">What is likely to happen if the party opts for a path of political liberalization? You say that it’s Mr. Xi’s best hope for escaping a crackup, and he could resume the tentative embrace of greater engagement and openness that you say China saw under Jiang Zemin and even Hu Jintao. But party leaders appear convinced that liberalization would stir social demands and pressures that could seal their demise. So, are they damned if they do liberalize, and equally damned if they don’t?<br /></span></p><div style="clear: left; float: left; margin-right: 12px; margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 1px; border-bottom-width: 1px; border-bottom-style: solid; border-bottom-color: #666666; text-indent: 2px; width: 24px; min-height: 32px; font-family: nyt-franklin, arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 1.125rem; font-weight: 800;">A.</div><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">Again, go back to examine what the party was doing circa 2000-2008. A return to that politically reformist path could conceivably be managed by the party, implementing step-by-step, incremental political opening and change without losing control and falling from power. It is not certain, but given what I know about Chinese political culture and society, I think it is a far better option for the party than the default repression option they are currently exercising. So, I am hopeful this might occur.</p><p style="margin-bottom: 1em; font-size: 1rem; line-height: 1.4375rem; font-family: georgia, \’times new roman\’, times, serif; max-width: 540px;">But, actually, I’m very doubtful it will, because of the way that Xi Jinping, Liu Yunshan — the party leader responsible for ideology and propaganda work — and other senior leaders think about political reform. Still, I would note that Chinese politics since Mao has undergone a series of opening-closing cycles (known in Chinese as fang and shou). Normally the open phases last about five to six years and the closing cycles two to three years. We are currently in year seven of “closing.” An optimist would say that we are well overdue for an opening period! I would like to be optimistic, but my analytical judgment, unfortunately, tells me otherwise.</p></div></div></div></div>